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Western Hemispheric Integration:
The Global and Political Context
Ambassador Richard McCormack *
I. Introduction.
The failure of the U.S. Congress to approve fast-track authorization for a new round
of trade negotiations, and the banking, financial, and currency crisis that began in Asia and
gradually spread to many parts of the globe, are two important realities that must be
understood to help us create a new, more favorable atmosphere for progress and coopera-
tion in the hemisphere.
Fifteen years ago, many commentators used to point to the economic growth in East
Asia as something that could also happen in Latin America-then in the middle of the so-
called "lost decade" of inflation, recession, and political tensions. But the current crisis in
Asia, which has sideswiped many of the economies in our region, is also an opportunity to
learn, but this time, from the mistakes of others. Since I travel frequently in Asia, meeting
with senior financial and governmental leaders every year, I thought I would take this
opportunity to share with you some observations about the financial crisis in Asia, its
causes, consequences, and dangers. Second, I want to say a few words about the current
political environment in the United States as it relates to trade policy in the hemisphere
and the associated implications and challenges.
In my experience, there are two main causes of the current Asian financial and bank-
ing crisis. The Asian development model itself is the main culprit for the distress now
unfolding in the region. The so-called Asian development model involves, in fact, various
forms of state capitalism, which entail the mobilization and leveraging of capital through
the banking system to create and support export-oriented industries, and later construc-
tion and infrastructure projects of various kinds. The second cause of the Asian financial
crisis had to do with poor collective judgment by creditors-domestic and foreign-of credit
risks. Too much money was sent chasing too few truly bankable projects and investments
in Asia and elsewhere.
The good part about the Asian state capitalist development model was that it enabled
some Asian countries to rapidly grow from a very low base. This happened when there was
a huge gap in the level of technology between those countries using the development
model, and those in more advanced countries.
* Former Under Secretary of State for Economics and Agriculture. Also served as U.S. Ambassador
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The model was attractive to some Asian governments because originally it allowed
local industries to be built without foreign investors and owners. The role for the foreigner
was designed merely to provide, wittingly or otherwise, needed technology and later, mar-
kets for the goods.
The system worked as long as there was a large gap in the technology between the
recipient country and that of more advanced countries. Also, the system functioned as
long as the production from the often directly and indirectly subsidized industries
involved a relatively small part of the national economies providing the subsidies.
Unfortunately, this process eventually entailed staggering leveraging of capital to pro-
vide cheap capital on a huge scale as a comparative competitive advantage to some of those
deploying this model of development. In the case of Japan, credit was extended on the basis
of collateralizing land values. For example, eventually the tiny plot of land in central Tokyo
where the Emperor's palace was located was worth more than the whole real estate value of
the state of Florida. Warrants were another favored device to provide cheap capital.
Armed with credit of this questionable nature, vast loans were extended to Japanese
and other Asian companies wishing to build factories and buildings. Since interest rates
were minuscule, there seemed to be no limit to the new facilities that could be constructed
or acquired. To further facilitate comparative advantage, many Asian economies were con-
structed on a two-tier basis: one tier for that part of the national economy directly
involved in the tradable goods section; the other, the vast domestic part of the economy.
The domestic economy was protected by various layers of barriers. The first tier was a
tariff wall. When that was forced down through trade negotiations and international pres-
sures, non-tariff barriers-including some imaginative structural ones-were quickly erected
to fill their function. When in turn some of them fell, others replaced them. The ultimate
barrier was a competitive devaluation of the currency, which avoided even the most
sophisticated WTO remedy.
In the case of Japan, a two-tier pricing system existed, where products were often sold
domestically at forty to sixty percent above the export price. In China, there was an even
greater use of the two-tier economy-one dollar-based, one Yuan-based. Thus, central to
the Asian development model was a trade policy of mercantilism, allowing captive domes-
tic markets and various competitive enhancement devices permitting penetration and
exploitation of foreign markets.
When it was only Japan playing the game, and others were willing to turn a blind eye
to much of the rigging of the system for various humanitarian, developmental, or Cold
War motives, it was not such a problem for the developed world. Indeed, it provided the
spur of competition to domestic industries which, in some cases, benefitted from this
competition. It tremendously forced the pace of innovation and efficiency in the United
States and elsewhere. The corpse of the United States television manufacturing industry
was a specter that hung over everybody else. You either got competitive fast, or you were
out of business. Furthermore, the strong dollar in the early 1980s added more pressure on
the U.S. manufacturers.
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For Asia, the system worked when only Japan was effectively deploying it on a large
scale. But the time soon came when other Asian countries similarly deployed the state cap-
italist/mercantilist model. Now, however, instead of competing merely against the U.S.
domestic companies, they were competing against each other with the same weapons. And
to survive, the U.S. companies began to off-shore much of their production to cheaper
platforms.
In Asia, fixation on market share became the name of the game. And while many
export industries, such as the Japanese auto industry, became immensely profitable, aided
by an undervalued currency, less and less attention was paid to the basic profitability of
many individual companies. And the subsidies required to keep this game going became
larger and larger in more and more places. In China, these subsidies include recycling the
people's savings to the state-owned factories and building developers. In Japan, it involved
reducing the interest return on savings to levels that hadn't been seen since the Great
Depression, but which permitted debtors and companies to continue their activities with-
out fundamental changes long beyond that which would have been permitted in the
United States.
The net result of this process was more debt accumulation, much too much produc-
tion capacity, and cutthroat competition among the mercantilist countries for market
share in more open export markets abroad and within the region. Without the discipline
of a rigorous project and banking analysis of individual loans, too much of everything got
financed. And even when some of the countries themselves followed reasonably careful
macroeconomic policies, microeconomic failure began to undermine the whole edifice of
Asian finance.
Too many banks were not carefully regulated by authorities. On the contrary, authori-
ties encouraged profligacy. Too many factories were not required to earn profits. Too many
buildings did not require tenants or the likely prospect of tenants in advance. And no one
was keeping track of global supply and demand in individual industries.
In the case of Japan, the whole problem was complicated by the decision of the Ministry
of Finance to conceal the full extent of the national banking crisis in the hopes that eventual
recovery of demand and growth would allow the bad debts to become good debts. But, in the
meantime, other countries were adding to the overcapacity in production and financing of
many long-term projects with short-term debt-often in foreign currencies.
The full impact of this problem on the already substantial U.S. trade deficit did not hit
the United States as early as it might have because of the fall of the dollar in 1994-95,
which was caused by relatively accommodative U.S. monetary policies, the overhang of
dollars in international markets from the accumulated current accounts deficit, and other
factors. Thus the United States was, for a time, shielded from the Asian competition to a
degree, and set about rebuilding some domestic manufacturing capacity. Now, of course,
all that has changed.
When China devalued the Yuan in 1994, it put the rest of Asia into a competitive dis-
advantage that threw all earlier calculations out of the window. An attempt to keep the
impacted economies going resulted in a construction and real estate boom, encouraged by
southeast Asian governments, and financed by foreign and domestic banks and investors.
In the end, all it did was to create spectacular urban skylines throughout Asia, many
ephemeral personal fortunes, another huge layer of debt to the national economies, and
postpone the eventual day of reckoning.
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In the case of Japan, the fiscal correction in March of 1997 removed two percent of the
GNP worth of fiscal stimulus on the foolish assumption that the economy had revived suf-
ficiently to survive such a shock and to permit self sustained growth and demand. Only the
Ministry of Finance was surprised when higher taxes on consumers led to a renewal of the
Japanese recession and a collapse of domestic confidence. The Ministry's response to this
turn of events was to attempt to gear up another export-led recovery on top of the already
large trade surplus. Again, only the Ministry of Finance was surprised when the U.S. gov-
ernment reacted strongly against the idea that U.S. debt accumulation via a trade deficit,
rather than Japanese domestic demand, should jump-start the Japanese economy.
II. The Deadly Politics of the Asian Development Model
and the Consequences.
As I mentioned earlier, the good part about the Asian state capitalist development
model is that it enabled some countries in Asia to grow rapidly from a very low base. The
bad part about the Asian development model was that it proved very difficult to make it
work efficiently after a certain level of development and intra-regional competition had
been established and when the technology gap had been significantly narrowed.
Furthermore, it proved extremely difficult to make a transition from the outmoded model
to a more efficient system once these governments had established programmed industrial
winners with state directed capital. These governments, in effect, created very wealthy and
politically powerful interest groups with a heavy vested interest in the status quo. Many of
these entities also grew "too big to fail" without an unacceptable political cost.
Thus, when they ran into trouble with highly leveraged financial arrangements it
became politically and economically difficult to force the system to allocate capital more
efficiently. Instead, the only solution that some governments were able to try was to
encourage even more growth, particularly in export oriented industries and construction.
Moreover, when the export industries from countries with widely varying standards of
living began to experience painful competition-with each other's exports all trying to pene-
trate foreign markets-the temptation too often was to continue to go after an increased
market share rather than to focus on the bottom line of individual company profits. For
example, a year ago, I attended a meeting at the OECD in Paris on the subject of excess
capacity in the automobile industry worldwide. Everyone there knew that there was shortly
going to be 20 million units of excess global auto production capacity per year, but everyone
at that meeting of government and industry had plans to build more auto plants. Korea and
Japan had the most ambitious plans. Alas, this was also true of other industries.
Recently, while in Japan, I met a top representative of one of the largest U.S. glass
companies, who informed me that, every time his company built a new glass factory in
Asia, Japan's Asahi glass company built another in the same neighborhood, and then cut
prices to the bone.
And this story, in different forms in different industries and in different countries,
partly explains why there is a growing glut in so many industrial commodities and prod-
ucts today-a problem intensified by the subsequent recessions in Asia and elsewhere which
led to a vicious circle of shrinking demand and devaluing currencies. In violating the most
elemental rules of supply and demand, the banks which have financed this overcapacity in
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everything from cars to glass to office buildings now find themselves in the midst of a seri-
ous banking crisis that reaches far beyond Asia. The local banking crisis had caused wealth
and markets in Asia to shrink dramatically. Thus, there will be immense continuing pres-
sure on export markets to keep local factories operating and servicing their debts to the
banks and other creditors.
Currencies have devalued throughout Asia. Some, like Thailand, because they were
forced to do so by events. Some, more or less voluntarily, like Taiwan, to compete in third
markets against other regional countries which were also rapidly devaluing their curren-
cies. The devaluations continue.
III. The Role of Foreign Investors and Banks in the
Asian Financial Crisis.
The earlier failure to make sound judgments on overall credit risks helped cause the
original Third World Debt Crisis of the 1980s when banks shoveled money into the Third
World without paying attention to the ability to service the debts under less than optimal
conditions. Banks paid dearly for these mistakes. Ten years later, it is not secret that many
in Congress believe that a mistake was made in the handling of the Mexican financial crisis
of 1995 in rescuing the unwise foreign investors-the holders of Mexican bonds, particular-
ly the so-called tesobonos. That rescue, some believe, gave a false sense of security to many
investors and bankers who felt that risks in emerging markets no longer required due cau-
tion. The Russian default was only one of many later unpleasant surprises.
A year ago, I attended a gathering in the Caribbean, which included some highly
placed friends in the investment world. They reported to me that mutual fund managers
were all under immense quarterly pressure to keep up their return on capital. This, they
stated, was driving the managers more and more into higher yield areas with greater risks,
including domestic and foreign junk bonds. More and more of this money went into Asia,
Russia and other so-called emerging markets, chasing fewer and fewer solid investment
opportunities. Some tried to protect themselves by keeping loans as short a term as possi-
ble. But in the end, all this just puffed up the bubble more and more. And when every-
body-including local investors and foreign hedge funds-suddenly started adding up all the
problems, realized that the game was nearly up, and headed for the door, the Asian crisis
went acute, beginning in Thailand.
Sensing that lots of other countries had similar problems, money began to flee from
other places as well. And the crisis spread and indeed is still spreading. It eventually triggered
the largest by-volume, one day fall in U.S. stock market history, and the aftershocks were felt in
Brazil, Russia, and many other countries. Falling commercial bond prices and currency insta-
bilities added to the strain and set the stage for the most recent tensions in financial markets.
As far as I can tell, the world is about three-quarters through the first phase of this
financial crisis but we may not have seen the full impact yet, depending importantly, on
what happens in Brazil, Japan, and China in the months ahead. It is important to under-
stand that the hedge funds only helped bring the crisis to a head. The situation in Asia had
long become inherently unsustainable for all the reasons cited earlier in this analysis. Had
the crisis not happened last fall, the ultimate collapse would likely have been even worse,
and had even broader ramifications. In the meantime, the damage from the Asian financial
crisis has spread worldwide, impacting many countries in different ways.
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There are various categories of countries which have been impacted. Class one is com-
prised of those countries which suffered from the original financial excesses and excess
investment. Class two is comprised of those countries which suffered from the contracting
economies and net demand from the class one countries when they imploded. Raw material
producers were important members of class two countries, particularly oil producers. The
third class of countries are those whose manufacturers and exporters were damaged by
competing exports from class one countries with depreciated currencies. But at a certain
stage in the process, via the financial system and net loss of demand, all these problems,
whatever their original cause, can start into a vicious downward spiral, unless very strong
actions are taken to stimulate net demand in places where policy room for this action exists.
Today, however, the U.S. stock market is still above the levels that caused Alan
Greenspan to warn about undue exuberance in stock markets with his famous December
1997 speech at the American Enterprise Institute. And the Economist magazine for months
had urged Greenspan to tighten monetary policy to deflate the stock market bubble. The
pain thus far inflicted on the global financial markets is not yet at the point likely to cause
G-7 Central Banks collectively to pour large quantities of liquidity in the market-unless
there is a sudden collapse of the Japanese financial system, which now looks less likely in
the period immediately ahead.
But global financial markets are still very nervous, and the Federal Reserve lowered the
interest rate twice in recent weeks. This happened because, while the broadest measure of
the U.S. money supply by historical standards is relatively generous, serious and potentially
dangerous liquidity problems began to develop in selected financial markets. When stock
and bond prices began to decline in August, it triggered high losses among various invest-
ment houses and their bankers. This forced sales of additional assets, particularly among
those hedge funds and investment banks which were highly leveraged and vulnerable to
margin calls. Those who borrowed large amounts of Japanese yen to finance their invest-
ment and speculative activity suddenly had to repay those yen to cover their losses. This, in
turn, triggered massive shifts in dollar-yen relationships and caused many more who had
borrowed yen, for whatever purpose, also to have to repay those yen loans urgently. This
further depressed the currency ratio and forced still other fire sales. The Russian default
put added strains on the investment community, and there was fear that default could later
spread to other countries with serious economic problems.
U.S. banks then ceased any even marginally risky lending, while many other investors
ran for cover into cash and short-term treasury bills, not knowing when the next shoe was
about to drop. It became almost impossible to borrow money to finance normal Wall
Street transactions. The inability of the governing board of the IMF and World Bank to
reach definitive solutions at their meeting further spooked markets. There was some dan-
ger that the resultant Wall Street liquidity shortage, and general market uncertainties,
could trigger broader problems. Thus, the Federal Reserve acted to increase the liquidity in
those financial markets to calm fears.
In doing this, Chairman Greenspan and his colleagues appear wisely to have bought
time for a more orderly adjustment to take place-one based on rationality rather than
panic and uncertainty. However, it does not seem likely to me that the answer to the cur-
rent stresses in global financial and currency markets is going to come mainly from the
U.S. Federal Reserve or from the Euro-zone Central Banks. The control of inflation will
still remain the most important bottom line for these monetary authorities. Thus, a heavy
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policy burden is still going to fall on many individual countries with macroeconomic
imbalances, current account deficits, or other problems in need of correction.
It is also clear that in some countries, official statistics on current accounts, budgetary
projections, exchange reserves, or monetary emissions have what we call a "fudge factor"
built into them, which understates the full extent of the local problems. But as we have
seen in Asia and elsewhere, fiddling with the numbers that are fed to the public doesn't
make the problems go away. It just makes everybody nervous, including friendly govern-
ments, the IMF, and foreign and domestic investors. It is a thousand times better to be can-
did, and then deal with the actual problems as they evolve.
IV. Some Hopeful Prospects.
At the recent annual meeting of the IMF/World Bank in Washington, there was an
unusual amount of tension, recriminations, finger pointing and soul searching. Many left
that series of meetings profoundly exhausted and depressed. As one of those who attended
some of those sessions, I did not have this reaction. Quite the contrary. I felt that authori-
ties everywhere were finally facing up to the full reality of the financial crisis that was
threatening economies worldwide. Recognition of the problem is always the first step in
solving it.
Within days after the conclusion of the meetings, the U.S. Congress approved an $18
billion infusion of capital and secured IMF policy reforms that will ultimately benefit all
concerned. Then the Japanese government approved a half trillion dollar fund to help deal
with the potentially catastrophic problems in their financial and banking system.
The Brazilian Government announced its intention to deal with their out of control
budget deficits, and is obviously carefully examining measures to deal with other problems
that are causing capital flight, currency instability, and economic slowdown. The govern-
ment is also dealing with the problems that threaten to spread to their neighbors, creditors,
trading partners and, most importantly, the living standard of the Brazilian people.
Then, the Federal Reserve acted to ease the squeeze on Wall Street. In Europe, political
leaders and some central bankers were less categorical than earlier about interest rate
reductions under future possible contingencies. Finally, for various reasons, the yen
strengthened to the point that the threat of immediate competitive devaluations by China
and other east Asian countries to combat the earlier weak yen has temporarily eased. But
all together, these new developments represent significant progress in the battle to contain
global financial dangers. It is, of course, clear that we are not yet out of the woods.
The erasure of wealth on such a titanic scale and the heavy blows to local banking sys-
tems in Asia and elsewhere constitute a serious long-term problem. Moreover, there are
still serious threats to currency stability in some countries. The deep recessions in some
places also mean continued problems.
All this is going to require careful management of existing problems and volatilities
and, in some cases, political leadership skills will be called upon to encourage patience in
countries under strain, and cooperation from those in a position to offer assistance. The
next year is going to be a critical one. Much of Asia will remain in recession. Europe is low-
ering its growth estimates, as are the United States and other countries.
The U.S. trade deficit next year is projected to reach $300 billion, on top of an existing
cumulative deficit of over a trillion dollars, which must be serviced. Profits and employ-
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ment will be threatened in those sections, particularly in the manufacturing area, where
competition from those exporting in devalued currencies will be keen. Since many service
industries are built around the jobs provided by the manufacturing area, the problems in
the directly impacted area can make other parts of the American economy spongy.
A $300 billion deficit sustained for a few years can quickly add another trillion dollars
to the net U.S. debt. And, to paraphrase the late Senator Dirksen: "A trillion dollars here, a
trillion dollars there. Pretty soon it adds up to real money."
These deficits, and the concerns for job security in the United States, have helped
undermine the climate in the U.S. Congress for ambitious new trade negotiations. The
President's request for fast-track authority was thrice rejected by Congress this year. I'm
sure he will try again. But even the modest African trade initiative was defeated in
Congress, opposed also by Jesse Jackson and other African-Americans who are con-
cerned about job loss in the United States, particularly in the textile area. Were the North
American Free Trade Agreement to be submitted to Congress today, it probably would
not pass again, notwithstanding the strong continuing support of many of its original
proponents.
It is also dear that the Brazilians are disposed to slow up the process of trade liberal-
ization to enable them to advance with their MERCOSUR objections, and digest the earlier
openings on trade and investment. Does this mean that the inter-American economic
agenda has ground to a halt? Certainly not. The Santiago Summit of the Americas earlier
this year set forth an extensive agenda of action items that merit implementation. This
conference will consider many of these important issues.
We also need to be creative on trade policy to give all of our peoples new confidence
in the trade negotiation process. We may need, for example, to consider how to factor cur-
rency devaluations into the trade negotiation process, so that a tariff tradeoff is not simply
nullified by the next currency devaluation. This subject, of course, goes well beyond the
normal purview of trade ministries, so we will need to engage our finance ministries in
this endeavor as well. Part of the problem can be addressed by stable, sound, sustainable
macroeconomic policies in all countries. Similarly, we will need to renew our efforts to
deal with non-tariff barriers. German auto manufacturers complain, for example, that
thirty percent of the value of every German car sold in Japan is due to the need to over-
come non-tariff barriers against imported cars. This amounts to a thirty percent tariff, and
is not an isolated example.
But I feel confident, particularly within this hemisphere, that our creative imagina-
tions can overcome many of these problems with enough patience and time. We can all see
the result of past hard work and regional cooperation. In 1997, Latin America as a whole
had its best economic performance in a generation, with real growth at five percent and
inflation at only eleven percent-the lowest in more than half a century.
In 1986, as the U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States, I made a pre-
sentation to the Conference of Great Cities of the Americas entitled "Obstacles to
Investment and Economic Growth in Latin America.' At the time, this was a highly contro-
versial paper in many countries in the hemisphere.
Today, thanks in part to President Bush's Enterprise for the Americas initiative, and to
some outstanding leadership in Latin America, massive progress has been made on virtual-
ly every item in that paper.
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V. Conclusion.
We have all come a long way together in the past fourteen years. But presently, we are
facing a major global financial crisis that has ramifications for each one of us. For us to
emerge from this problem, all of the countries involved must act on many different levels,
remembering the important positive and negative lessons of the recent past.
Locally, it is essential that macroeconomic stability be restored. If another round of
currency instabilities begins in this hemisphere, then we potentially face years of problems.
Institutions like the IMF can provide emergency loans for some countries under threat.
But as in the case of Brazil, $30 billion fled the country in a matter of weeks when concern
about currency stability began to undermine confidence. Only sound and sustainable poli-
cies can restore that confidence. Otherwise, the $30 billion proposed emergency loan fund
of the IMF for Brazil will disappear just as quickly as the $30 billion of the Brazilian
investors and savers. During the 1980s debt crisis, the Brazilian government signed eleven
different letters of intent with the IMF. It did not honor a single one of them, causing some
to recall Lucy, Charlie Brown and the annual disappearing football. This shouldn't start
happening again. Otherwise, the problems will spread to all of Brazil's trading partners
and to the Brazilian people's living standards.
Similarly, in places where commodity prices like oil have declined, budgets based on
higher projected revenues must also be constantly modified to reflect current realistic
income projections, to avoid future currency crises and inflation that are otherwise
inevitable. Collectively, we must also work together on our common agendas in a way that
can elicit the support and confidence of all our peoples. All this will take imagination and
effort, but this is what must be done.
